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Abstract
Young generations demand substantially more social insurance than
older generations, although program rules have been constant for decades.
I postulate a model where the utility of taking up social insurance beneﬁts
depends on the past behavior of older generations. The model is estimated
with individual panel data. The intertemporal mechanism estimated can
account for half of the younger generations’ higher demand for social in-
surance beneﬁts. The inﬂuence of older generations’ behavior remains
when instrumenting using mortality rates, which makes a compelling case
for a causal intertemporal inﬂuence on individual demand.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
I study the adaptation of demand for beneﬁts following an expansion of welfare
state institutions, and estimate the speed at which rational agents adapt to
new social conditions in a simple model used by theorists. I estimate a model
that allows for preferences to adapt to aggregate behavior, in eﬀect allowing
social norms to adjust to observed behavior. I ﬁnd substantial long run adap-
tation with regard to the demand for welfare state beneﬁts, an increase of one
percentage point in beneﬁt take up per birth cohort.
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Figure 1. Sick Leave Participation Rate by Cohort
Young generations have much higher take up rates compared to those born
earlier. The pronounced increase across generations in the take up of sick leave
beneﬁts occurred while program rules remained constant.1 A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e
1, the generation born in 1919 has an average take up rate of 45 percent, that
is, they use sick leave beneﬁts a bit less than half the years they are in the labor
force. For the generation born 1960 the take up rate is almost 80 percent.2 Each
younger birth cohort has a take up rate that is almost 1 percentage point higher
than those born one year earlier. I account for a large number of factors that
could inﬂuence beneﬁt take up and potentially explain the cohort trend, yet,
this trend persists. Figure 1 suggests that behavior has adapted signiﬁcantly
1Take up is deﬁned as receiving some (that is, at least one day of) beneﬁts during the year.
2Older generations are observed later in their life cycle when their health may be worse, so
higher take up rates might have been expected for older generations compared to the young.
2in the face of constant institutions, consistent with theoretical analyses about
changes in work norms in the welfare state.
The analysis contributes to a primarily theoretical literature on long term
dynamics. The model is closely related to the evolution of work norms mod-
eled in Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
Quantifying the size of this adjustment and estimating a particular mechanism
through which this adjustment takes place is an empirical question that to my
knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst to provide an answer to.
I write down an empirical model of program participation that includes a
psychic cost for claiming beneﬁts.3 I estimate a psychic cost function and quan-
tify how the past behavior of older cohorts inﬂuences individual behavior. The
estimated model can account for half of the increased demand across genera-
tions.
The psychic cost modeled, which operates on the demand for beneﬁts, would
apply to any social insurance program. I focus on the take up of sick leave
beneﬁts in Sweden. What makes the program particularly suited for study
is the lack of supply side constraints. Behavior reveals demand without any
supply interference, as claiming some beneﬁts is completely at the individual’s
discretion.
I estimate the importance of the psychic cost versus a general shift over
time towards more social insurance take up. I apply an instrumental variables
approach to identify the intertemporal inﬂuence of older cohorts. Mortality
rates are used as an instrument for the older cohorts’ sick leave behavior. This
approach isolates the inﬂuence of the older generations’ behavior to the part
that is shifted due to unexplained mortality shocks. The inﬂuence of the older
cohorts’ behavior remains strong. The result is robust to controlling for mor-
tality shocks that are common across cohorts, hence using only the variation
in mortality shocks speciﬁc to the reference group. The analysis makes a com-
pelling case that the estimated intertemporal inﬂuence in the demand for social
3The term psychic cost is used to describe the mechanism. What is modeled and estimated
is the inﬂuence of reference group behavior. This may be, internal or external, stigma or some
other eﬀect that is captured by the reference group’s behavior such as social learning.
3insurance is causal. This provides unique evidence on how individuals adapt to
institutions.
The dynamic model estimated diﬀers from the previous cultural transmission
literature that has focused on determinants of diﬀerent equilibria, but largely
ignored the analysis of the path towards a new equilibrium.4 The analysis is
fundamentally distinct from the social interactions literature and from studies
of the persistent eﬀects of institutions in that both literatures are based on cross-
sectional diﬀerences.5 I study intertemporal diﬀerences, across generations and
within life cycles, to examine how individuals adapt to social conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. The third section describes the sick leave program, followed by the
data description. Section 5 examines the cohort trend by accounting for indi-
vidual characteristics. In the sixth section I develop the empirical model and
the empirical results are presented. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The study of long term adjustments in demand for social insurance, where
individual behavior is followed across decades, complements several existing
literatures. The eﬀect of norms on labor supply (or beneﬁt up take) has been
studied both theoretically and empirically. The model I develop is most closely
related to Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003) in how individual heterogeneity
and the psychic cost are modeled, but it is also close to Lindbeck, Nyberg, and
Weibull (1999). Other models with delayed responses are the intergenerational
transmission of traits or work norms by Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), Bisin and
Verdier (2001, 2004), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), and Tabellini (2008). I
examine the inﬂuence of role models across generations rather than the link
between parents and children. Empirical applications include transmission of
4See for example Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) and Tabellini (2010), as well as the
handbook chapter by Bisin and Verdier (2010).
5Studies of the inﬂuence of culture using immigrants, as surveyed in Fernandez (2010),
have a similar focus on cross-sectional diﬀerences.
4work norms from parents to children (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004;
Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006). The analysis is also related to the dynamics of
the welfare state in Hassler, Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003).
Fogli and Veldkamp (2010) study the evolution of female labor force partici-
pation. They write down a model of social learning similar to Fernandez (2008).
The model is calibrated and the predictions of the model are close to the ob-
served trends. Their emphasis on a model consistent with the data, without
claims to a causal mechanism, is diﬀerent from this paper’s focus on examining
a causal mechanism to explain the cohort trend.
There is a growing literature on the impact of beliefs or culture on economic
outcomes and the paper is closely related to studies of how institutions and
policy interact with beliefs.6 The question I analyze is similar to studies on how
institutional arrangements aﬀect norms, like the eﬀect of Communism on at-
titudes towards redistribution studied in Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007).
I study how exposure to welfare state programs aﬀects demand for social in-
surance, where diﬀerent generations are treated diﬀerentially with respect to
welfare state exposure. This exposure may aﬀect norms regarding claiming gov-
ernment beneﬁts, which in turn could aﬀect demand for beneﬁts. Changes in
such norms may aﬀect economic outcomes.7 Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer
(2010) argue that trust aﬀects regulation, based on a cross-country analysis. Al-
gan and Cahuc (2010) use a model of intergenerational transmission of beliefs
to examine the eﬀect of trust on per capita income. Luttmer and Singhal (2011)
ﬁnd evidence that cultural background, as well as current factors, aﬀect atti-
tudes towards redistribution. My paper complements the literature by studying
dynamics of norms within one country. Individual panel data allow a much
richer analysis with respect to the intertemporal adaptation and more detailed
controls, including ﬁxed individual characteristics, where the related literature
to a large extent rely on country level variation.
Social interactions is a related literature, but distinct from the intertemporal
6See the handbook edited by Benhabib, Bisin, and Jackson (2010).
7The mechanism is similar to what Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duﬂo, Pande, and Topalova
(2009) explore in the sense that exposure aﬀects preferences, which in turn aﬀect actions.
5analysis. That literature focuses on cross-sectional or spatial mechanisms, for
example a contemporaneous eﬀect of beneﬁt up take in your reference group
on your behavior. The eﬀects of social interactions in the take up of welfare
beneﬁts have been studied empirically by Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan
(2000) and Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003).8 The eﬀects of social norms
have been studied in the context of unemployment insurance, a related social
insurance program, see Bruegger, Lalive, and Zweimueller (2010), Stutzer and
Lalive (2004), and Clark (2003). None of these studies of social interactions
have analyzed the intertemporal adaptation process, which I do.
The program participation literature casts the take up decision as a trade oﬀ
between time and consumption. Another way to view the sick leave decision is
as an expression of well-being, which ties in with the literature on self reported
well-being.9 What I have labeled a psychic cost may be seen as a relative or
positional concern in the language of the well-being literature. This literature
builds on a model where the relative position has a contemporaneous eﬀect on
well-being, for example Luttmer (2005) ﬁnds that individuals who have neigh-
bors with higher income have lower well-being, while controlling for own income
and characteristics as well as neighborhood factors.10 That is, they assume an
immediate cross-sectional, usually spatial, eﬀect of the reference group’s in-
come/consumption on your well-being. The model in this paper focuses on an
intergenerational link the existing empirical literature has not entertained.11
8Two papers on the social interactions in the use of sick leave in Sweden are Hesselius,
Johansson, and Vikström (2009) and Lindbeck, Palme, and Persson (2008). Both papers focus
on contemporaneous spatial interactions, not the intertemporal link I focus on. Henrekson
and Persson (2004) studies sick leave in Sweden in a long aggregate time series, but they make
no intergenerational links.
9Graham (2009) ﬁnds that health is the strongest correlate with self reported well-being in
a large cross section of countries. Daly and Wilson (2009) study suicides as a manifestation
of low subjective well-being, which is similar to the argument regarding sick leave.
10Additional evidence that well-being is partly driven by relative position are Clark and Os-
wald (1996), Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Kingdon and Knight
(2007), and Clark, Kristensen, and Westergård-Nielsen (2008).
11Furthermore, all these papers use self-reported survey measures of well-being, which has
short comings as discussed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Ravallion and Lok-
shin (2001). The measure of well-being in this paper, sick leave, is based on actions, which
overcomes shortcomings of the previous literature.
63 The Sick Leave Program
Sweden has a generous publicly run sick leave insurance program that covers
lost earnings in the case of basically any injury or illness.12 It is very easy to
claim the beneﬁts. For the ﬁrst week of each spell, the law gives the individual
the discretion to determine if he is ﬁt to work or not. If he wants to claim the
sick leave beneﬁts he makes two phone calls, one to the social insurance oﬃce
and one to his employer.13 There is no ﬁxed allocation of sick leave days, you
can use the insurance as long as your sickness requires and for as many spells
as you like. For spells up to 7 days the individual himself determines if he is ﬁt
to work. For spells longer than 7 days it is required that a physician validates
your condition.14 Monitoring of actual sickness is very light, at least in part
due to the diﬃculty in verifying conditions like stomach ache and back pain.
The program is similar to any social insurance. It pays out beneﬁts if the
individual is hit by some shock. In the sick leave program it is a health shock,
while unemployment beneﬁts cover unemployment shocks and pensions pay out
based on age. What sets the sick leave program apart is the level of individual
discretion with respect to claiming beneﬁts. The decision to claim beneﬁts rests
entirely with the individual, and observed take up behavior is purely driven by
the demand for beneﬁts.
The rules governing sick leave insurance have been remarkably constant over
the 1974-1990 period. The sick leave program was ﬁrst passed into law in 1962
(SFS 1962:381) and it took eﬀect in 1963. Data on sick leave are available from
1974, when sick leave beneﬁts became taxable income.15 The replacement rate
for lost earnings due to sickness was set to 90 percent. The daily beneﬁti s
calculated as 90 percent of normal annual labor earnings divided by 365, up to
a cap. The replacement cap is indexed to the so called base amount, which is
12In a comparison to the U.S. the program encompasses both ’personal days’ provided
in employment contracts (although restricted to sick leave) and the workers’ compensation
program.
13Beneﬁts are paid by the social insurance oﬃce directly to the claimant.
14Since we analyze the extensive margin, the validation by the physician is not relevant in
our study.
15The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1973:465.
7related to inﬂation. About 93 percent of the incomes are below the cap, and 6
percent of the sick leave observations are above the cap.
Beneﬁts can be claimed from the second day of the sickness spell. The
deﬁnition of the second day is, however, quite generous. It is suﬃcient to call
in sick before midnight and that day counts as the ﬁrst day of the spell. If
you think you’ll be sick tomorrow you can always call in sick today and the
ﬁrst unpaid day is of no consequence, and if it turns out that you’re ﬁtf o r
work tomorrow you can change your mind. This system was in place until 1987.
From 1988 through 1990 the ﬁrst day of no coverage was abolished.16
Most sick leave spells are short, about 95 percent are shorter than one month
(Source: Försäkringskassan). You need to have earnings for six months in order
to qualify for the sick leave beneﬁts and be less than 65 years of age. The
program is universal and it is administered by the central government and does
not depend on your employer. Beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through a ﬂat pay roll tax.
4D a t a
I use registry data on individual panels over the period 1974 to 1990 (from 1973
for lagged income).17 I follow a random sample of the 1974 population for 17
years. The baseline regression has just short of 2 million observations based on
the behavior of about 160,000 individuals. Birth cohorts from 1917 to 1963 are
included. About 3 percent of the population is sampled.18 Household members
are included in the data, so I can control for the household composition and
spousal income. The data draw information from several sources; demographic
information from the population registry, income information from the tax au-
thorities, and various public beneﬁts from the social insurance administration.
The main dependent variable, participation in the sick leave programs, is de-
16The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1987:223.
17The analysis ends in 1990 since later reforms make the data hard to compare. The
employers take over sick leave payments for the ﬁrst two weeks of each spell, which is not
observed in the data. Such longer term sick leave is very diﬀerent from what is analyzed here.
18The only sampled individuals who disappear from the data are those who die or emigrate.
For further details on sample selection and data coverage see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).
8ﬁned based on observing positive sick leave beneﬁts during the year. Data on
sector of work is available from 1979 and on.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Sick leave participation 0.637 0.481 0 1 1930462
Year of birth 41.9 11.3 17 63 1930462
Earned income, lagged 127519 319262 0 1.99E+08 1929137
Capital income, lagged 1748 57136 0 4.81E+07 1929137
Age 40.0 10.7 22 60 1930462
Man 0.525 0.499 0 1 1930462
College, 3+ years 0.113 0.316 0 1 1930462
< 3 years college 0.091 0.287 0 1 1930462
High school 0.380 0.485 0 1 1930462
Married 0.602 0.490 0 1 1930462
Months with infant x Woman 0.101 0.757 0 7 1930462
Children aged 7 months to 2 years 0.064 0.249 0 4 1930462
Children aged 3 to 6 years 0.131 0.341 0 3 1930462
Children aged 7 to 15 years 0.286 0.460 0 3 1930462
Husband's income, lagged 56178 288605 0 1.68E+08 1929137
Wife's income, lagged 26976 57974 0 2.10E+07 1929137
Employment rate, by county 0.870 0.021 0.807 0.912 1930462
Average earnings, by county 130946 14071 94790 173337 1930462
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. Amounts in 1990 SEK.
Individuals are included in the analysis from ages 22 to 60. The age restric-
tions are due to the looser connection to the labor market of individuals at the
tails of the life cycle. The young may still be studying and may not have a ﬁrm
foot in the labor market. At ages close to retirement individuals face a num-
ber of incentives to leave the labor force that aren’t modeled here, and those
observations are excluded. Since the sick leave program is designed to replace
lost labor earnings, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are labor force
participants.19 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
19Labor force participation is deﬁned as having positive labor earnings during the year.
95 Increased Demand For Social Insurance
5.1 Aggregate Trends
It is possible the raw averages in Figure 1 capture life cycle patterns, for exam-
ple, young generations are observed when they have young children that may
make them take more sick leave during those years.20 Figure 2 plots the average
take up by age for four diﬀerent cohorts where cohorts can be compared at the
same stage in the life cycle. Men are plotted in the left panel and women on
the right. Across the entire life cycle, younger generations have higher take up.
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Four Cohorts of Women from 1974 to 1990
Sample: Labor force participants, ages 22-60.
Figure 2. Sick Leave Participation for Men and Women.
There may be concerns that changes in labor force participation are behind
20There are at least two causes for this. Parents may use the sick leave program to take
care of sick children, or sick children make the parents sick.
21Note also that there is no drop oﬀ after the main child rearing ages, indicating that this
factor does not drive the cohort trend.
10the increasing sick leave take up across generations.22 For women the labor
force participation rates have increased across generations and the 1955 cohort
of women have rates similar to men. Men’s labor force participation rates have
been constant across generations (along the life cycle paths), indicating that
labor force participation changes don’t explain the increased sick leave take up.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Sick Leave Across Cohorts.
Comparing the cohorts that are of age 25 and 45 in 1974, born in 1929 and
1949, I ﬁnd that the share that never takes sick leave has dropped from 13.8 to
1.6 percent. Further evidence on this shift in the distribution of sick leave across
cohorts is presented in Figure 3. The ﬁgure plots the distribution of how often
individuals use the sick leave program across cohorts.23 For the oldest cohort
22This would be a concern if the marginal labor force participants are more prone to use
sick leave.
23For each individual I’ve computed the number of years of sick leave participation when
11born in 1929 the mode of the distribution is to never use the program. For the
next cohort born in 1935 the mode has shifted to always using the program. The
shift from infrequent to frequent use of the program continues for the cohort
born in 1942, and it is most pronounced for the cohort born in 1949.
5.2 Baseline Regression
So far only raw averages have been presented. Column 1 of Table 2 presents
the average slope of the cohort trend, 0.8 percentage point per year, which adds
up to a 16 points higher take up rate for a cohort born 20 years later than the
base cohort. The results are from using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimator. This estimator only uses the variation across individuals as the year
of birth does not vary over the life cycle.
One concern may be that the raw average is confounded by life cycle pat-
terns, which may vary by groups as seen in Figure 2. I include a full set of
interactions between gender, the four education groups,24 age and age squared.
Including these controls raise the estimated cohort trend as seen in column 2,
indicating that life cycle patterns mask an even stronger cohort trend. If par-
ents with young children take more sick leave, and these parents are mostly
observed among the younger cohorts, it may bias the estimate of the cohort
trend upwards. Detailed controls of the number of children at diﬀerent ages are
included in column 3, and the estimated cohort trend is similar to the previous
speciﬁcation.
Younger cohorts tend to have higher education and may have higher earnings
(conditional on age) than older cohorts. If sick leave is a normal good, it could
be that the higher take up rate is in part an income eﬀect. I control for own
earnings and capital income as well as the spouse’s income (if present). The
income variables are lagged one year since current income and sick leave take up
in the labor force, divided by the number of years in the labor force. The fraction has been
scaled by multiplying by 17, so the histogram expresses what number of years out of 17 that
individuals used the program.
24The four education groups are 3 or more years of college, less than 3 years of college, high
school degree, and less than a high school degree.
12may be jointly determined. I also control for regional business cycles (through
the regional employment rate) and regional ﬁxed eﬀects.25 These controls do
not aﬀect the cohort trend much, as seen in column 4.
Table 2. Cohort trend in sick leave program participation.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of Positive Sick Leave
Pooled OLS Estimator
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year of birth 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010
(.0003) (.0005) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Age, age sq interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
with gender and education
Months with Infant x Female Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child 7 months-2 years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child 3-6, Child 7-15 years Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital status Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income lag Yes Yes
Capital income lag Yes Yes Yes
Spouse's income lag Yes Yes Yes
Business cycle control Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Permanent income Yes
Permanent income spline Yes
Income lag spline Yes
Observations 1955691 1930462 1930462 1929137 1929137 1929137
Notes: Education is gouped into 3+ years of college, <3 years of college, high school, <high school.
Months with infant counts the number of months there is a child of up to 7 months of age.
Business cycle control is average regional employment rates.
Permanent income is an estimated individual fixed effect of earnings on demographic interactions and 
BC controls. Spline is 5 piece with knots at quintiles.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled OLS estimator.
Standard errors, clustered by birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
It is possible that not only current earnings but lifetime earnings aﬀect the
sick leave choice. Using the panel data, I run an individual ﬁxed eﬀect (within)
25The objective is not to explain regional diﬀerences in take up. There are 8 regions.
13regression of individual earnings on the age-gender-education interactions men-
tioned above and business cycle controls. The individual ﬁxed eﬀect from that
regression is the measure of permanent income, which I include in the regression
in column 5. Permanent income has little impact on the cohort trend.
Linearity of the income eﬀects may be a strong assumption that is relaxed
in column 6. I construct ﬁve piece splines of both permanent income and lagged
income.26 This allows the income eﬀects to diﬀer across quintiles both for per-
manent and lagged income. The estimated cohort trend remains stable at 1
percentage point per birth cohort. The speciﬁcation in column 6 is the baseline
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Figure 4. Cohort Fixed Effects for Sick Leave Participation
26The results are robust to using 10-piece splines.
145.2.1 Non-Linearity
I replace the linear cohort trend assumed in Table 2 with ﬁxed eﬀects for each
cohort. The estimated coeﬃcients, after having accounted for all the controls
in speciﬁcation 6, are plotted in Figure 3.27 The cohort eﬀects are quite close
to a linear trend, so the linearity assumption does not seem to drive the result.
5.2.2 Health Trends
Deteriorating health for younger cohorts could be an explanation for the co-
hort trend. Measures of health outcomes, however, paint a diﬀerent picture.
Younger cohorts have improved health along objective measures. Expected
remaining longevity at age 20 increased by 1.76 years for men and 2.16 years
for women between the early 1970’s and the late 1980’s. The occurrence of
heart problems has decreases as well. For the 45-64 age group the average
rate of heart problems during 1980-1982 was 5.0 percent. These problems had
decreased to 3.2 percent in the 1990-1992 period (Source: Statistics Sweden).
The fraction of the population 16-84 that report that their health status is gen-
erally good has increased slightly from 74 to 75 percent between 1980 and 1990.
Cancer mortality has decreased across cohorts. Among 30-34 year old women
in the late 1960’s the mortality of cancer was 21 per 100 000 persons. In the
early 1990’s the rate had dropped to 13.5. The corresponding rates for men
were 16.7 and 11.2. Reductions in mortality rates are seen at most points in the
age distribution across cohorts (Source: NORDCAN). Improvements in health
conditions across cohorts make the sick leave trends more surprising.
5.3 Robustness
Even though a host of factors were controlled for above there may still be al-
ternative explanations to the trend. One concern may be the measurement of
sick leave beneﬁts. Up until 1983 maternity leave was included in sick leave
beneﬁts but starting in 1984 the parental leave in connection to the birth of
27B e i n gb o r ni n1 9 1 7i st h eo m i t t e dc a t e g o r y .
15a child was reported separately. In addition, care for sick child was reported
separately from 1987. The sick leave variable is redeﬁn e da st a k eu po fa n yo f
the three programs (sick leave, parental leave, and care for sick child), but it
does not aﬀect the estimated cohort trend as seen in speciﬁcation 1 in Table
3.28
Since sick leave is not the only program individuals may use it is possible
that there is some shifting across programs, which could inﬂuence the estimate.
To examine the sensitivity to the use of other programs I exclude individuals
who have taken up either unemployment beneﬁts or welfare payments during
the year. The estimated cohort trend in speciﬁcation 2 in Table 3 is slightly
lower with this sample restriction, indicating a stronger trend among individuals
that use other programs.29 30
As the main regressions condition on being in the labor force there may
be concerns that individuals that have left the labor force would have been on
sick leave if they had remained in the labor force. In particular, there may be
concerns that among the older people only the healthy remain in the labor force,
which could drive the ﬁnding. To address this concern the sample is restricted
to those between 22 and 45 years of age, where there is little exit from the labor
force. This restriction does not aﬀect the cohort trend as seen in speciﬁcation
3 in Table 3.31Another approach is to assume that everyone outside the labor
force would have been on sick leave had they been in the labor force. I redeﬁne
sick leave such that all individuals outside the labor force are added to the sick
28It’s possible that young children are not appropriately controlled for by the linear controls.
To address this I exclude women with children between the ages 0 and 2 (only women since
care of young children were mostly done by women during the period we study). Excluding
this group does not aﬀect the cohort trend.
29Employers do not seem to collude with young workers. During slow times there may be
an incentive for the employer to reduce cost by inducing employees to take sick leave (paid by
the government). Younger workers with less job protection may be more likely to enter into
such an arrangement, which potentially could explain the cohort trend. I include sector ﬁxed
eﬀe c t si n t e r a c t e dw i t ha ni n d i c a t o ri ft h ep e r s o ni sl e s st h a n3 0y e a r so l d .I td o e sn o th a v ea
large impact on the cohort trend.
30The cohort trend is also robust to controlling for tax rates. Ljunge (2011) ﬁnds that tax
rates aﬀect sick leave, but tax rates don’t vary systematically across cohorts in a way that
can explain the take up trend across cohorts.
31Another compositional story would relate to immigrants. I include an indicator of being
born outside Sweden as well as the fraction of the working age population in your community
that is born outside Sweden. Including these controls increase the cohort trend somewhat.
16leave rolls (and there is no longer a sample requirement on being in the labor
force). The estimated trend is similar also in this speciﬁcation. Changes in
labor force composition can’t explain the cohort trend.
The ﬁfth speciﬁcation examines if the cohort trend could be explained by
diﬀerent take up rates across time by including year ﬁxed eﬀects. In this spec-
iﬁcation the age controls have to be excluded in order to identify the cohort
trend (but the gender-education interactions are included). The estimated co-
hort trend is still large and signiﬁcant indicating that the cohort trend can’t be
explained by generally rising demand for beneﬁts.
Table 3. Alternative explanations of cohort trend in participation.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of Positive Sick Leave
Alternative explanation: Program Use of  Labor force Labor force Secular
definition other programs composition 1 composition 2 drift
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year of Birth 0.0099 0.0094 0.0105 0.0102 0.0062
(.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0002)
Additional controls Broader  Exclude people Include only Redefine all Year fixed
or sample restrictions sick leave with UI  ages 22-45 outside labor effects
measure benefits, force  as  on 
welfare. sick leave
Observations 1929137 1820117 1292152 2183324 1929137
Notes: All controls used in Table 2, column (6), are included if applicable.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled OLS estimator.
Standard errors, clustered by birth cohort, in parenthesis. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
The model has been estimated for men and women separately. The cohort
trend is a bit stronger for women, and in particular unmarried women. Esti-
mating cohort ﬁxed eﬀects by gender also show a close to linear cohort trend,
and women on average have higher take up rates than men across birth cohorts.
175.3.1 Unemployment Insurance
Running the baseline regression with unemployment insurance take up, rather
than sick leave, as the dependent variable produces a signiﬁcant cohort trend
towards higher take up rates for younger cohorts.32 The ﬁnding supports the
hypothesis that the cohort trend is prevalent more generally. Unemployment
insurance is a social insurance program just like the sick leave program. Un-
employment insurance is, however, diﬀerent in several respects. There are some
supply side restrictions like veriﬁcation that the beneﬁciary is not employed and
that the beneﬁciary is required to register with the unemployment oﬃce.33
6 A Mechanism: Reference Group Inﬂuence
The psychic cost attached to claiming social insurance beneﬁts (Moﬃtt 1981)
may depend on the behavior of other individuals in the economy. In particular,
following Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003), psychic cost may not adjust
instantaneously to behavior in the reference group but with a lag. The more
common it is to claim social insurance beneﬁts, the lower is the psychic cost.
With the psychic cost adjusting slowly, behavior may adjust for a long time
before reaching a steady state. The higher social insurance take up of younger
generations is interpreted within the structure of a model.
6.1 Model
Consider a simple model of individual choice similar to Lindbeck, Nyberg, and
Weibull (2003), where individuals can choose to claim beneﬁts or not. If beneﬁts
aren’t claimed individuals consume their labor earnings.34 If beneﬁts are claimed
the worker consumes a fraction  of his earnings ( represents the replacement
32The ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant cohort trend is robust to a speciﬁcation with year ﬁxed eﬀects.
33Lemieux and MacLeod (2000) examines the long run increase in unemployment insurance
take up in Canada.
34Earnings may be after tax, where the tax revenues not used for the social insurance
program are used for government consumption that may be valued by individuals but it is
separable from private consumption and independent of social insurance take up.
18rate), enjoys some extra leisure, and suﬀers psychic cost . The preferences of





ln −  if no take up
ln −  +  if take up
(1)
where 0, 0 ≤ 1,a n d ≥ 0.  is the valuation of leisure (it may
be negative or positive) that varies between individuals.35 T h er a n d o ms h o c k
 aﬀects the value of taking up the social insurance beneﬁt.  is assumed to
be distributed i.i.d. (across individuals and time) with mean zero according
to cumulative distribution function Ψ with positive density on the whole real
line. The valuation of leisure is distributed according to cumulative distribution
function Φ, with positive density on the whole real line. I may also allow for
heterogeneity in  across individuals and time.
There is a valuation of leisure that makes an individual indiﬀerent between
taking up beneﬁts or not. Denote this valuation of leisure, conditional on ,b y

∗
 = −ln+ −. By integrating out the idiosyncratic component the cut oﬀ




[−ln +  − ]Ψ()=−ln +  (2)
The take up rate of the social insurance beneﬁt in the economy, call it , corre-
sponds to the fraction with 
∗,t h a ti s ,
 =1− Φ(
∗) (3)
The current psychic cost depends on the share of transfer recipients in group
 in the previous time period;  = (−1).36 Furthermore,  :[ 0 1] → R+
and  is continuously diﬀerentiable with 0 ≤ 0.
Individuals take prices, preference parameters, and −1, and hence the
psychic cost, as given. The equilibrium outcome in period  is a take up rate for
35In the estimation below there aren’t any parameter restrictions imposed.
36The psychic cost may be internal or external stigma, which depend on the reference
group’s behavior. Another interpretation is that  is an information cost and reference group
behavior lead to social learning about the program that aﬀects the cost.
19each group , , who is inﬂuenced by past behavior of group ,s u c ht h a t
 =1− Φ[−ln + (−1)] (4)
In a steady state (4) holds for any .
I assume that the parametric speciﬁcation for the psychic cost is
(−1)=0 − −1 (5)
where 0 0 This model is taken to the data on sick leave take up in
Sweden. An individual will take up the beneﬁts if −ln+−0+−1−0
Factors that may be allowed to inﬂuence the sick leave choice are captured by
a vector  for individual  in period  with an associated parameter vector
. These factors may be interpreted as capturing diﬀerences in the valuation of
leisure.
This results in an empirical model of sick leave for individual , a member of
group ,i np e r i o d, , which takes on the value 1 if any sick leave beneﬁts














 captures all constant parts of the model. It is possible to recover the slope
coeﬃcient in (5) from the data. The generosity of the program, captured by the
replacement rate ,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the inﬂuence of reference group behavior.
The replacement rate is part of the constant which only aﬀects average take up.
In this model the expectation might have been to see an S-shaped curve
in Figure 1 as would happen in a standard adoption model, see for example
Fernandez (2008).37 These models do, however produce a long straight segment
just like in Figure 1. For even younger cohorts one would expect a tapering oﬀ
of the curve as take up get closer to 1. There is at least a hint of this as the
37The S-shaped curve is similar to the cumulative density function of a Normal distribution.
20cohorts from the early 1950’s are above the regression line in Figure 4 while
the cohorts from the late 1950’s and 1960’s are below the line. For the oldest
cohorts there is no exponential take-oﬀ from very low levels. It may be that the
increasing demand trend started before 1974 during the less generous program
and that it would be observed it if data from the earlier period was available. It
could also be that the underlying distribution of preferences is not symmetric,
which could produce a more linear shape also for the oldest cohorts.
6.2 Reference groups
The groups are intended to capture ’synthetic colleagues,’ as the most direct
inﬂuence may be from colleagues who share the same professional characteris-
tics.38 Individuals who are a few years older and a bit ahead in the career may
serve as role models for the individual’s current decision. The role models could
set a standard for acceptable behavior.39 To capture the idea that colleagues
inﬂuence individual’s sick leave decisions I deﬁne the reference groups based
on age, education, sector, geographic area, and birth cohort. In the reference
group deﬁnitions I distinguish between two education groups, some college or
none, and two sectors, private or public. This deﬁnition of the reference group
as colleagues can’t make use of the ﬁrst few years of the sample period since the
information on sector is not available.
In line with the model I allow for the psychic cost to be aﬀected by the
fraction of the reference group that takes up the social insurance beneﬁts.40 I
assume that individuals may be inﬂuenced by the behavior of older cohorts in
a past year. When studying individual sick leave behavior I relate it to the
reference group ’s average sick leave take up denoted by . Reference group
 is the cohort born 2-4 years earlier than the individual in question in the
38Matched worker-employer data are not available for this period when the sick leave pro-
gram rules are constant and take up captures demand for the beneﬁts.
39Such mechanisms have been discussed in the developmental psychology literature, see for
example Harris (1995, 1998). There is also evidence that individuals are aﬀect by people in
their environment, see for example Bertrand et al (2000) and others discussed above.
40There is no a priori restriction of a positive relationship between the subject and the role
model. I allow for a negative relationship between the role models and the individual. Role
models would then provide ’cautionary tales.’
21same education and sector group living in the same county.41 The time lag is 3
years.42 The adjustment of psychic cost is hence slow in two dimensions, through
the inﬂuence of older cohorts on younger cohorts, and through the time lag. The
cross cohort lag is motivated by the inﬂuence of role models, that individuals
are inﬂuenced by those a few years ahead on the career ladder. The time lag
captures that the psychic cost may not adjust instantaneously but with a lag;
it could for example take a few years for individuals to observe the impact of
sick leave on their role models’ careers.
The results don’t rely on the exact deﬁnition of the reference group or the
time lag. I allow for reference groups that do not diﬀerentiate by education
and sector, which corresponds closer to reference groups as neighbors. The
results are also similar with alternative speciﬁcations of which cohorts are in
the reference group and for alternative time lags as discussed below. I don’t
interpret the speciﬁcation to be the one and only social inﬂuence on individual
behavior. Rather, the speciﬁcation captures, in an empirically tractable way, the
intergenerational spillover that is essential in the model to explain the behavior
across generations in Figure 1.43
7R e s u l t s
The model postulates a direct relationship between reference group behavior and
individual behavior. This relationship can be estimated in the data. Under the
assumption that the model is an accurate depiction of the real world (conditional
on the control variables) the slope parameter in the psychic cost function (5)
41I choose the county level for two reasons. The county is an area within which most people
live, work, and socialize. For practical reasons, there is also the need for a suﬃcient number
of individuals of each age to compute reference group behavior. Lower levels than the county
may be problematic for this reason.
42For example, the reference group behavior in the year 1985 for an individual born 1955 is
the average of the sick leave take up in 1982 of those born between 1951 and 1953 who live
in the same county and belong to the same education-sector group. There are 24 counties in
Sweden.
43For example, I don’t necessarily believe that all social eﬀects relate to only those born 2-4
years earlier. However, looking at those 2-4 years older is suﬃcient to capture an important
mechanism that has not been studied before.
22is estimated, which has a structural interpretation. This would provide a clear
insight for policy design by quantifying the ’rings on the water’ eﬀect of an
increased take up rate of the social insurance beneﬁts for some age group. All
else equal, program expenditures may increase for a long time due to the eﬀect
on the psychic cost, which induce other individuals to take up the beneﬁts, and
so on.44
If the real world is more complex than the model then the interpretation of
the estimates may change. It is possible that the true psychic cost is unobserved,
that is, the psychic cost is an omitted variable like attitudes and beliefs of
the reference group that in turn aﬀect individual behavior.45 Reference group
behavior may then capture these attitudes and beliefs, but the estimated slope
parameter in (5) would not have a structural interpretation if the psychic cost
function is not correctly speciﬁe d .A ni n c r e a s ei nb e n e ﬁt take up of the reference
group would not necessarily have a multiplier eﬀect on other’s take up. The
multiplier eﬀect would in this case only materialize if the increased beneﬁtt a k e
up in the reference group is caused by a change in underlying attitudes and
beliefs in the reference group.
7.1 Colleagues
Table 4 presents estimates using both the pooled OLS and the within esti-
mators.46 The estimates from the two methods have distinct interpretations,
which are explored. The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations use the pooled OLS estima-
tor.47 The estimate on the reference group behavior is to a large extent identiﬁed
from variation across individuals. The reference groups are based on the mea-
sure of colleagues, which exhibit variation across 41 birth cohorts, 4 skill-sector
groups, and 24 counties. The coeﬃcient on reference group behavior is positive
44The intergenerational mechanism has the potential of explaining the pattern in ﬁgure 1,
in contrast to a purely spatial mechanism since generations are not systematically separated
spatially.
45In this case we would not be able to distinguish exogenous social interactions from corre-
lated eﬀects as discussed by Manski (1993).
46Included are the same individual and aggregate controls as in speciﬁcation 6 in Table 2,
except for year of birth.
47The estimator assumes that individual eﬀects are randomly distributed.
23if individuals whose reference group have relatively high sick leave take up (3
years earlier) themselves have relatively high sick leave take up. The estimate
is 0.47 as seen in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 4. Under the strict assumptions
of the model (no omitted variables that aﬀect the estimate) the slope estimate
captures the inﬂuence of the psychic cost ( in the model).
Table 4. Reference group behavior (colleagues) and sick leave participation.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Linear probability model regressions
Reference group Colleagues: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier in individual's sector and 
skill group, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.468 0.457 0.458 0.123 0.124
sick leave behavior (.016) (.016) (.016) (.01) (.01)
in year t-3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 932917 932917 932917 928312 928312
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition,
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects.
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Individual panel data from 1979-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
However, if unobservables are allowed, for example initial individual con-
ditions like work norms instilled by parents, which are correlated with aver-
age reference group behavior, then the estimate picks up both eﬀects. Then
the estimate is a combination of reference group inﬂuence and individual ﬁxed
characteristics. To examine if the pooled OLS estimate of the reference group
inﬂuence is only picking up some unobserved characteristic of individuals that
diﬀers across generations I estimate the model accounting for unobserved ﬁxed
24characteristics using the within estimator. In the within case the estimate is
identiﬁed from variation in reference group behavior within the same individ-
ual.48 The individual ﬁxed eﬀect would capture any inﬂuence of work norms
instilled by parents. A signiﬁcant estimate of reference group behavior would
support the presence of time varying inﬂuences, that there is an inﬂuence of
the psychic cost on individual behavior within the life-cycle while accounting
for unobserved individual characteristics. The estimate of 0.12 is obtained with
the within estimator as seen in speciﬁcation 4 in Table 4, and the estimate is
strongly signiﬁcant.49
There is a signiﬁcant impact of reference group behavior on sick leave take
up in the estimation across individuals also after accounting for ﬂexible time
eﬀects. In speciﬁcation 2 in Table 4 a linear time trend is included in the pooled
OLS estimation, which controls for a linear increase in the demand for sick leave
over time. The coeﬃcient estimate on reference group behavior remains similar
in magnitude and signiﬁcance. I also allow for non linearities in the time eﬀects
by including time ﬁxed eﬀects, which account for any aggregate inﬂuences on
sick leave, in speciﬁcation 3 in Table 4.50Again, the coeﬃcient estimate on the
reference group behavior remains similar to the previous speciﬁcations. An
alternative approach to account for changes over time and generations is to
include cohort ﬁxed eﬀects rather than the time eﬀects. Such a speciﬁcation
also produces a positive and highly signiﬁcant estimate on the inﬂuence of the
reference group’s behavior.
The inﬂuence of older generations account for between two-ﬁfths and half of
the increasing demand across generations, depending on the speciﬁcation. The
average reference group take up for the cohort born in 1930 is 52.0 percent.
For the cohort born in 1950 the corresponding take up is 68.9 percent. By
48The estimate is positive if the individual is more likely to take up sick leave in periods
when the reference group of older people’s lagged take up is relatively high.
49Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on birth cohort. This level of clustering allows
for arbitrary correlations of error terms across years, skill groups, and counties within each
birth cohort.
50T h et i m ee ﬀects are in part identiﬁed from the fact that not all individuals are in the
analysis all years, for example, the youngest cohorts are not observed in the 1970’s. The time
eﬀects hence mechanically absorb some of the variation across cohorts.
25multiplying the diﬀerence with the pooled estimate of 0.46 in column 1 of Table
4 the reference group’s inﬂuence increases the younger cohort’s take up rate by
7.8 percentage points, which is about 40 to 50 percent of what was estimated
in Table 2.51
Including year ﬁxed eﬀects in the within estimator alters the interpretation
on the estimated coeﬃcient of reference group behavior.52 Without year ﬁxed
eﬀects the coeﬃcient is identiﬁed from mean deviations of reference group be-
havior. With year ﬁxed eﬀects the within coeﬃcient estimate is identiﬁed from
mean deviations of reference group behavior and mean deviations from the na-
tional average take up, basically a double diﬀerence. The estimated coeﬃcient in
speciﬁcation 5 of Table 4 indicates that the inﬂuence of reference group behav-
ior conditional on national behavior is similar to not conditioning on national
behavior.53
7.1.1 Instrumenting for reference group behavior
To further examine the hypothesis an instrument is used to get exogenous shifts
in sick leave behavior of the reference group. I use mortality rates corresponding
to the cohorts and locations of the reference groups to instrument for reference
group behavior.54 The idea is that mortality rates are the result of serious health
shocks, which also aﬀect sick leave take up. Implicitly, I only consider variation
in reference group behavior that is correlated with these serious health shocks.55
Mortality rates are decreasing across cohorts while sick leave is increasing across
cohorts. The aggregate trends are hence stacked against ﬁnding a positive in-
ﬂuence of mortality on sick leave, as I hypothesize.
51The raw average in column (1) of Table 2 indicates a 16 percentage point higher take up
rate for the cohort born 20 years later. The estimate in column (6) of Table 2 produces a 19.6
percentage point higher take up rate for the younger cohort.
52Introducing a linear time trend is not meaningful in the within context since age is already
controlled for, which contains the same variation as a time trend.
53The estimate in speciﬁcation (5) is not directly comparable to speciﬁcation (3) since the
pooled estimate does not have a similar double diﬀerence interpretation.
54The instrument is not intended to explain the cohort trend in sick leave, the mortality
rate just provides exogenous variation in the reference group’s behavior.
55These serious health shocks contrast with arguably less serious shocks to the value of
leisure such as big athletic events, see Skogman-Thoursie (2004).
26I observe mortality rates per 1000 population by year, age and county. Mor-
tality rates are assumed to follow a simple model with a second order polynomial
in age and a random shock. Denote the mortality rate in county ,f o rt h eg e n -
e r a t i o nb o r ni ny e a r,i ny e a r by  then
 = 0 + 1 + 22
 +  (8)
Mortality shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across counties, generations, and
years. The model explains about 85 percent of the variation in the data. As the
main regression includes controls for age and its square it’s only the remaining
variation in the error term that is used to provide exogenous variation in ref-
erence group behavior. I could also allow more complex models of mortality,
for example with year ﬁxed eﬀects56 b u ti tw o u l dn o ta ﬀect the analysis in the
speciﬁcations that control for year ﬁxed eﬀects.
T h em o r t a l i t yr a t e su s e da si n s t r u m e n t sa r ed e ﬁned as far as possible in
the same way the reference group behavior is deﬁned. Since mortality data is
not available by education-sector groups, corresponding to the reference group
’colleagues,’ the instrument is computed at a higher level. That is, the mortality
rate per 1000 of those born 2-4 years earlier by county, lagged 3 years, is used to
instrument for the sick leave take up by those born 2-4 years earlier by county
and education-sector group, lagged 3 years.57 The identifying assumption for
this approach is that older cohorts’ mortality rates have no direct impact on
individual sick leave decisions three years later. The only impact comes through
the older cohorts’ behavior.58
The models are estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS). The instru-
ment exhibits variation across counties, generations, and years. The ﬁrst stage
regressions show a positive relationship between mortality rates and sick leave
56Adding year ﬁxed eﬀects to the model increases the explanatory power by about 1 per-
centage point. In a model with year eﬀects I could relax the assumption that health shocks
are independent across counties and allow for common time trends.
57In the case of the reference group ’neighbors,’ which does not distinguish between
education-sector groups, the instrument is computed for exactly the same level as the ref-
erence group.
58More formally, the assumption is that the mortality shocks in (8) for the generations 2-4
years older in year t-3 are uncorrelated with the leisure shocks to the current generation in
year t in the main model (6).
27up take as hypothesized. The instrument is not weak.59 The ﬁrst stage results
are reported in Table A1 in the appendix.
Table 5. Instrumental variable estimates of reference group influence (colleagues).
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Instrumental Variable/2SLS regressions
Instrument: Mortality per 1000 population for cohorts born 2-4 years earlier by county in year t-3
Reference group Colleagues: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier in individual's sector and 
skill group, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.724 0.796 0.759 0.795 0.659
sick leave behavior (.083) (.079) (.075) (.206) (.177)
in year t-3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 932917 932917 932917 928312 928312
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition, 
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects. 
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
The second stage results are presented in Table 5. The ﬁrst estimate from
the pooled 2SLS estimate is 0.72. Including a year trend produces an estimate
of 0.79, larger than without the instrument. The pooled estimate with fully
ﬂexible year eﬀects is 0.76, again a bit larger than the OLS estimate.
Instrumenting has a big impact on the within estimates, which are now larger
in magnitude compared to the results without instruments. The within estimate
is 0.79 in column four.60 With year ﬁxed eﬀects the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.66,
59The instrument has t-values of at least 5 in ﬁrst stage regressions, and tests based on
Kleibergen-Paap statistics reject the hypotheses of weak instruments and underidentiﬁcation.
The results are robust to including county ﬁxed eﬀects rather than regional ﬁxed eﬀects.
60The demographic interactions can be seen as controlling for learning over the life cycle,
28as seen in speciﬁcation 5 in Table 5.
Overall, the estimated inﬂuence of role model behavior is larger when in-
strumenting with mortality rates.61 Role model behavior shifted by these health
shocks has a substantial inﬂuence on individual behavior. It indicates that the
individuals in the reference groups whose sick leave is shifted by the instrument
have a large inﬂuence on the behavior of younger cohorts compared to the av-
erage behavior of the group. The marginal individuals shifted by the mortality
s h o c kc o u l dh e n c eh a v eal a r g ee ﬀect on the psychic cost. It is also possible that
instrumenting has removed bias due to mismeasurement of role model inﬂuence,
which would lead to higher estimates. The estimates in Table 5 are fairly similar
across speciﬁcations. That the pooled and within estimates aren’t substantially
diﬀerent would indicate that there aren’t omitted variables correlated with sick
leave behavior that drive the result as the omitted factors controlled for by the
individual ﬁxed eﬀect doesn’t aﬀect the estimates.
Challenges to the identiﬁcation include omitted time trends at the county
level that correlate with both reference group mortality and behavior. One
candidate may be diﬀerential trends in productivity across counties, as individ-
uals in counties with low productivity growth may ﬁnd it increasingly beneﬁcial
to take sick leave relative to counties with high productivity growth. If these
productivity trends were correlated with mortality rates it may confound the
results. Average labor earnings by county are controlled for to capture such
trends.62
The mortality shocks used as instruments could capture health shocks that
are common to all cohorts. Examples could be a contaminated water supply
or pollution from a factory. It may be important to account for health shocks
that aﬀect the individual studied as well as his reference group. The results are
robust to including the current mortality rate of the individual’s own cohort as
where the learning follows a second order polynomial for each of the demographic groups.
61The magnitudes are similar to the eﬀects on high school graduation in Cipollone and
Rosolia (2007). Those authors use an earthquake to get exogenous variation in the reference
group’s behavior.
62The results are also robust to controlling for county level ﬁxed eﬀects.
29a control variable, as seen in Table 6.636465 This control captures local trends
that aﬀect the mortality shocks of both the own cohort and the reference group.
I am hence controlling for common inﬂuences on mortality and only variation
in mortality speciﬁc to the reference group is used to identify the inﬂuence of
reference group behavior. The results in Table 6 are very similar to Table 5,
indicating that common shocks to mortality across cohorts do not drive the
results. Omitted trends that would challenge the identiﬁcation would not only
have to correlate with the reference group’s mortality and sick leave across
counties, cohorts, and time; the trends would also have to be uncorrelated with
the own cohort’s mortality rate. Hence, these county level trends would have to
diﬀer in a very particular way for generations born a few years apart.
The instrumental variables approach deals with potential sorting, for exam-
ple that individuals with a high valuation of leisure could move to places where
the psychic cost of claiming sick leave beneﬁts is low. First, the individual
ﬁxed eﬀect accounts for that individuals diﬀer in their valuation of leisure in
unobservable ways wherever they reside. Second, in the within speciﬁcations
unexplained mortality shocks are used to get exogenous variation in reference
group behavior. The mortality shocks are hence positive some years, and for
some cohorts, and negative in other periods. Migration ﬂows don’t match the
patterns of unexplained mortality shocks.
63The results are also robust to controlling for the own cohort’s mortality rate lagged 3
years (rather than the current rate). In all cases these mortality rates are measured at the
county level just like the reference group’s mortality rates.
64This may be interpreted as relaxing the assumption that the health shocks in (8) are
independent across generations and time.
65The relatively weak inﬂuence of the own cohorts mortality rate in table 6 may seem at
odds with the ﬁrst stage results. However, one may separate the mortality shocks into one part
related to sick leave and one part that is unrelated to sick leave. The part that is unrelated
to sick leave only produces noise in the estimation, and the results indicate that this noise is
cancelled out when averaged across cohorts.
30Table 6. Instrumental variable estimates, with control for own cohort's mortality rate.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions
Instrument: Mortality per 1000 population for cohorts born 2-4 years earlier by county in year t-3
Reference group Colleagues: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier in individual's sector and 
skill group, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.699 0.770 0.726 0.796 0.652
sick leave behavior (.0913) (.0858) (.0786) (.2107) (.1792)
in year t-3
Own cohort's mortality 0.0019 0.0015 0.0018 0.0010 0.0015
rate in year t (.001) (.001) (.0008) (.0009) (.0008)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 923672 923672 932917 920487 920487
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition, 
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects. 
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
7.2 Neighbors
In this section I turn to an alternative speciﬁcation of the reference group. The
approach is intended to capture the inﬂuence of neighbors, who may provide an
inﬂuence beyond the colleagues studied above. The reference group is deﬁned
as those cohorts born 2-4 years earlier who live in the individuals county.66
T h es a m e3y e a rt i m el a gi su s e da sa b o v e . W i t ht h er e f e r e n c eg r o u pl a b e l e d
neighbors there is variation across 41 birth cohorts and 24 counties.
66This deﬁn i t i o no fr e f e r e n c eg r o u p sh a v em o r eo b s e r v a t i o n sa si ti sp o s s i b l et ou s em o r e
years of the sample where sector information is not available.
31Table 7 presents the estimates based on the pooled OLS and within esti-
mators in speciﬁcations that mirror Table 4. The pooled OLS estimates are
similar with and without a year trend, as well as when year ﬁxed eﬀects are
included. The within estimate in column 4 of Table 7 is a bit larger than the
estimate based on colleagues. Including the year ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcation 5
produces a larger estimate of 0.28. It indicates that conditioning on the aver-
age national behavior may be important when neighbors are considered as the
reference group.
Table 7. Reference group behavior (neighbors) and sick leave participation.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Linear probability model regressions
Reference group Neighbors: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.470 0.406 0.461 0.182 0.278
sick leave behavior (.019) (.021) (.022) (.019) (.018)
in year t-3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1510026 1510026 1510026 1505686 1505686
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition,
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects.
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
7.2.1 Instrumenting
There may be concerns that the estimates on Table 7 don’t capture a causal
eﬀect. An instrumental variables approach is applied where the mortality rate
32for cohorts born 2-4 years earlier who reside in the same county is used to instru-
ment for the reference groups behavior. The groups for which the instrument is
computed match the reference groups. Both the pooled and the within models
are estimated by 2SLS. The ﬁrst stage estimates, which are positive as hypoth-
esized, are reported in Table A2. The ﬁrst stages are not weak.
Table 8. Instrumental variable estimates of reference group influence (neighbors).
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Instrumental Variable/2SLS regressions
Instrument: Reference group mortality rate per 1000 population by county in year t-3
Reference group Neighbors: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.813 0.775 0.861 0.785 1.038
sick leave behavior (.088) (.061) (.071) (.135) (.146)
in year t-3
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1510026 1510026 1510026 1505686 1505686
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
The estimates of the pooled model are about 0.8 as seen in the ﬁrst three
speciﬁcations in Table 8. The estimates are a bit higher than the 0.7 estimated
in Table 5. The results indicate that the inﬂuence of the reference group could
be a bit stronger when looking at the broader group of neighbors rather than
colleagues, although the conﬁdence intervals overlap. The estimate of 0.79 in
the within speciﬁcation in column 4 in Table 8 is almost exactly the same as
33in Table 5. The estimate in column 5 of Table 8, where the year ﬁxed eﬀect
are included, are higher than the previous estimate and follow the same pat-
tern as without instrumenting in Table 7.67 T h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e8a r ef a i r l y
similar across speciﬁcations.68 The range 0.75 to 0.78 is within the 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals of all the estimates. The similarity between the pooled and
within estimates indicates that unobserved ﬁxed characteristics correlated with
sick leave behavior have little eﬀect on the estimated eﬀect of reference group
behavior when the instrumental variables approach is used.
There may be a concern that the mortality shocks are driven by a factor
common to all generations, as discussed above. Including the mortality rate
of the own cohort in the county accounts for mortality shocks common across
cohorts. Results are presented when including the current mortality rate of the
individual’s own cohort in Table 9. Results are very similar if also the mortality
rate lagged 3 years is included. The estimates in Table 9 are very similar to
Table 8, only slightly smaller in magnitude.
67The estimated coeﬃcient is now 1.04, although it should not be interpreted literally. A
large part of the conﬁdence interval is still below unity. It indicates a very strong inﬂuence
of reference group behavior when we condition on the national average behavior through the
year eﬀect.
68The results are robust to controlling for county ﬁxed eﬀects.
34Table 9. Instrumental variable estimates, with control for own cohort's mortality rate.
Dependent Variable: Indicator of positive sick leave benefits
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions
Instrument: Reference group mortality rate per 1000 population by county in year t-3
Reference group Neighbors: Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier, living in individual's county
Time lag 3 years
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference group 0.769 0.746 0.845 0.758 1.019
sick leave behavior (.084) (.061) (.072) (.138) (.152)
in year t-3
Own cohort's mortality 0.0019 0.0017 0.0008 0.0014 0.0008
rate in year t (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1510026 1510026 1510026 1505686 1505686
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition, 
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects. 
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1974-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
7.3 Robustness: Additional controls, diﬀerent cohorts and
time lags, placebo
To account for individual work habits I have included 4 lags of labor earnings
and 4 lags of labor force participation as controls. I have also restricted the
sample to individuals who have been in the labor force all of the past 5 years
(year t through year t-4). The estimated reference group inﬂuence is robust
to these alternative speciﬁcations, indicating that individual work habits don’t
aﬀect the estimate of reference group inﬂuence.
35The results don’t rely on the particular reference group or the time lag. I
ﬁnd similar results when the time lag is 1 year or 5 years. The results are also
similar if I redeﬁne the reference group to those 2-6 years older, or those 1-3
years older (and these changes are also robust to changing the time lag).69 As a
falsiﬁcation test I have also estimated a model where I use the 3 year lead of the
2-4 years older cohorts’ behavior. The lead should not have an impact on current
behavior according to the hypothesis. The estimated eﬀect is insigniﬁcant at
conventional levels, in line with the hypothesis.70
7.4 Alternative Interpretations
7.4.1 Health consciousness
Younger generations could have a greater awareness of how their actions aﬀect
their health along the lines of Ehrlich (1990, 2000). The young cohorts could
hence use sick leave based on a pre-cautionary motive where they invest in their
health by taking sick leave. Such behavior could explain at least part of the
increasing take up across generations in Figure 1. To the extent this health
consciousness diﬀer systematically across cohorts and individuals it is captured
by the individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the within regressions. A remaining concern
would be if the health consciousness responds to the mortality shocks for the
reference groups (lagged 3 years) used in the regressions above. Although such
an interpretation is possible, it does not seem as the most likely explanation
since the results are robust to controlling for the own cohort’s mortality rate
(both the current and past rates), which arguably would have a larger and direct
eﬀect on the individual’s health consciousness. Yet, if there is such a health
consciousness diﬀerence across cohorts it may be expected that the inﬂuence of
69I have also estimated a model where the reference group is 2-4 year younger, which would
correspond to a model with young ’trend setters’. I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect, although its
signiﬁcance is much lower than for the model with older reference groups. For this reason I
prefer the model with older reference groups.
70Note that the lead of the reference group’s behavior is the valid ’placebo’ treatment in
this setting. As individuals may be inﬂuenced by several other cohorts it would not be valid
t ou s es o m ed i ﬀerent cohorts as placebos. I don’t claim that the estimated reference group is
the one and only inﬂuence. I do claim that we ﬁnd one channel of reference group inﬂuence
that captures one important intertemporal channel of behavior.
36reference group behavior diﬀers across cohorts. I have estimated a model where
the reference group inﬂuence is allowed to diﬀer between older and younger
cohorts. The point estimate for reference group inﬂuence is lower for the older
cohorts compared to the younger cohorts but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
The evidence does not seem to support such diﬀerences across cohorts.
7.4.2 Monitoring
It could be possible that diﬀerent generations are subject to diﬀerent monitor-
ing or punishment. If older generations are punished more severely for using
the sick leave program it could lead to lower take up among these generations.
Employers would be the ones delivering the punishments since the monitoring
by the social insurance administration is basically non-existent during the pe-
riod. Any systematic diﬀerences across individuals would be captured by the
individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The remaining concern is that monitoring would covary
with reference group behavior and mortality rates across individual life cycles.
Given that the reference group’s mortality rate is lagged three years there is no
obvious reason to expect the current monitoring of the own cohort to depend
on these factors, in particular since the own cohort’s mortality shocks are con-
trolled for. However, if such diﬀerences exist they may be expected to diﬀer
by sector. Private proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms may have a stronger incentive to
punish potential shirkers compared to public sector employers. Estimating the
model for public and private employees separately do not reveal any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the reference groups inﬂuences, indicating that diﬀerential
monitoring across generations does not aﬀect the estimated eﬀects.
Colleagues could be monitors. One way this could work is that there are
few colleagues around to monitor if they are on sick leave themselves, but it
is not clear that their absence three years ago would have an eﬀect on current
sick leave. Another channel is if a larger absence among colleagues would make
the individual care less about any potential punishment from the colleagues,
but this channel would be one example of the psychic cost hypothesized in the
37model above and hence ﬁt well with the main interpretation of the results.
7.5 Taking Stock
Taken together, I believe the analysis builds a strong case for causality; that
reference group behavior, as shifted by mortality shocks, has a direct inﬂuence
on individual sick leave decisions. The identifying assumption is that there
aren’t omitted local trends that correlate with reference group mortality and
behavior but are uncorrelated with the mortality of those a couple of years
younger. I may entertain stories that there are local trends in for example drug
abuse (or pollution) that aﬀect both sick leave and mortality. Such trends could
potentially challenge the identiﬁcation since both reference group sick leave
and mortality as well as individual sick leave could be aﬀected by the same
drug abuse trend. It is reassuring that the inﬂuence of role model behavior is
robust to including the own cohort’s mortality rate, as the own group’s mortality
would capture the drug abuse trend.71 Using reference group mortality as an
instrumental variable, and controlling for the mortality of the individual’s own
cohort, makes a compelling case that one channel of intertemporal inﬂuence in
sick leave choices has been identiﬁed.
8C o n c l u s i o n
How do individuals adapt to institutions? Plenty of evidence show that in-
stitutions shape diﬀerent outcomes across locations.72 However, precious little
evidence exists on how these outcomes come about. It is known that societies
a n dc o m m u n i t i e se n du pw i t hd i ﬀerent outcomes based on the institutions they
face or faced, but very little is known about how they got there.
I model a preference mechanism that can explain the dramatic increase in
demand for sick leave across cohorts in Sweden. Individuals’ beneﬁtt a k eu p
71If the drug abuse trend did not aﬀect mortality it would not be a challenge in the ﬁrst
place since it would be uncorrelated with reference group mortality, and hence not part of the
variation used to identify the estimate.
72See for example Bisin and Verdier (2010), Fernandez (2010), and Tabellini (2008b).
38decision is allowed to depend on the behavior of ’role models.’73 Ie s t i m a t et h e
model and it can account for a majority of observed behavioral diﬀerences across
cohorts. This is the ﬁrst paper to estimate the long-run dynamic adaptation
of individual behavior in the welfare state. The underlying mechanism studied
is present in several literatures.74 Yet, few papers empirically evaluate how
institutions and economic outcomes aﬀect preferences over time.
I provide evidence on how norms evolve and how they aﬀect behavior using
a large individual panel data set. Variation across diﬀerent generations as well
as variation over time within individuals is used to estimate a model where
the take up decisions depend on the past behavior of role models. I ﬁnd that
being exposed to older generations that used the sick leave program more is
associated with higher individual demand for the program. Mortality rates
are used to instrument for reference group behavior to address concerns that
omitted variables, such as local health or productivity trends, may drive the
results. Variation in reference group behavior due to unexplained mortality
shocks have a substantial impact on individual decisions to take up sick leave.
The instrumented results point to a strong and robust intertemporal inﬂuence
of reference group behavior on individual decisions.
I focus on the take up of sick leave beneﬁts in Sweden, since this decision is
purely determined by individual demand. Individuals assess themselves if they
are unﬁt to work and want to collect sick leave beneﬁts. Changing behavior can
be seen as an estimate of how the self-assessed threshold for claiming beneﬁts
change. The speciﬁcs of the program lend it to study of the intertemporal
mechanism modeled, but the mechanism and the results are quite general. The
intertemporal mechanism does not preclude that for example spatial interactions
are present or that there are additional intertemporal mechanisms. The model
captures a quantitatively signiﬁcant mechanism, and the instrumented results
73Preferences are modeled such that the threshold for claiming beneﬁts depends on your
experience with role model behavior.
74The program participation literature talks about stigma aﬀecting choices. The literature
on culture asks how beliefs aﬀect economic outcomes. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) model the
evolution of work norms.
39provide compelling evidence that the intertemporal mechanism is indeed one
channel of inﬂuence on individual decisions.
The estimated intertemporal adaptation mechanism may apply to all kinds
of welfare state programs. The ﬁndings, that younger generations use social
insurance more than the older generations, correspond with survey evidence on
attitudes towards claiming public beneﬁts among the young. Younger genera-
tions have a higher acceptance of claiming public beneﬁts one is not entitled
t oa c c o r d i n gt ot h eW o r l dV a l u e sS u r v e y . 75 This is a consistent ﬁnding across
countries, including Sweden, and indicates that the intertemporal mechanism at
work in Sweden could be relevant elsewhere.76 The model could apply to other
social insurance programs with diﬀerent levels of generosity as the intertemporal
mechanism does not depend on the generosity or particulars of the program.
Being exposed to welfare state institutions may have a profound eﬀect on
individuals’ behavior. The increasing take up rates of beneﬁts across cohorts in
Figure 1 plainly show that a substantial shift in society is in progress. I pos-
tulate and estimate a particular mechanism to explain the trend. Experience
with role models who demand more social insurance result in higher individual
demand, both when compared across generations and along the life cycle path
within generations. The analysis indicates that large policy reforms don’t take
place in a static environment. Preferences for program beneﬁts may not be
ﬁxed. Individuals gradually adapt to the environment and demand more ben-
eﬁts. For generations born a few decades apart this adds up to a fundamental
shift in behavior where the young have much higher demands on public pro-
grams. Quantifying the adaptation process to the public policy, and estimating
a speciﬁc mechanism using a new empirical strategy are this paper’s unique
contributions.
75The wording of the question is ’Do you think it can always be justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed,
or something in between, to claim government beneﬁts to which you are not entitled.’
76This pattern is robust to controlling for gender, education, employment status, marital
status, income, country ﬁxed eﬀects, and survey wave eﬀects.
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44Table A1. First stage regressions (colleagues).
First stage results corresponding to Table 5.
Dependent Variable: Reference group sick leave
Reference group Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier in individual's sector and skill group, 
living in individual's county
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mortality rate per 1000 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.007
population in cohorts 2-4  (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) (.0014) (.0014)
years older by county
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 932917 932917 932917 928312 928312
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition, 
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects. 
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1979-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
Table A2. First stage regressions (neighbors).
First stage results corresponding to Table 8.
Dependent Variable: Reference group sick leave
Reference group Cohorts born 2-4 years earlier living in individual's county
Estimator Pooled Pooled Pooled Within Within
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mortality rate per 1000 0.016 0.022 0.020 0.010 0.008
population in cohorts 2-4  (.0024) (.0023) (.0023) (.0015) (.0014)
years older by county
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 932917 932917 932917 928312 928312
Notes: Controls include age and age sq interacted with gender and education, household composition, 
marital status, capital income and spousal income, average county earnings, and regional fixed effects. 
5 piece splines of lagged income and permanent income included. Splines have knots at quintiles. 
Mortality rates computed as number of deaths divided by population by age and county cell.
Individual panel data from 1979-1990, annually. Estimates of the pooled and within estimators.
Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on birth cohort, in parenthesis.
Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old. There are 24 counties.
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